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Summary
This paper examines a number of inter-related questions, which portend a different kind of corporate governance than the accumulation and refinement of fiduciary responsibilities heaped upon boards over the last twenty years.
 Is short-termism in corporate management a truly serious problem? If so, why has it come about?
A pernicious combination of factors may well bring about a short-term perspective in corporate management: 1. Financial players threatening actions against management if it does not deliver increased share price; 2. Boards of directors intimidated by activist hedge funds and proxy advisors; 3. Warped incentive systems prodding and "bribing" management to take actions to boost short-term stock price.
 Are activist investors and hedge funds really short-term players whose actions have a negative impact on corporations in the longer term?
According to Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner ["Stock Duration and Misvaluation", SSRN No.2190437, December 2012] , the average share holding period of institutional investors has barely changed since 1985; it hovers between 1.2 and 1.5 years.
Remarkably, some have concluded from these results that institutional investors are not short-term holders! Since when holding shares for 1.5 years turns one into a long-term holder? These results actually show that the trend to shorter holding period has been in place since the 1980's. By 1985, the average holding period had already dropped to some 1.5 years; the further drop (to under one year) may be the product of speed traders and others; but there is no doubt that shares were held for a much longer period of time before the first wave (since the 1920s) of short-term "investors" appeared in the 1980s.
 Do boards really need to be better insulated from the actions of "activist" investors as well as from unwanted takeovers?
Canada is very different from the U.S. in matters of corporate ownership and board empowerment. The three "bêtes noires" of U.S. activist institutional funds and proxy advisors are non-issues in Canada:
1. Splitting the roles of Chair and CEO (Only 41% of S&P 500 companies have separate Chair and CEO position and in many cases that chair person is not an independent member but the former CEO; fully 85% of Canadian companies have divided the roles of Chair and CEO, an important principle in situations of conflicts with shareholders);
2. Eliminating staggered boards and electing all members every year. A third of the S&P 500 companies still have staggered boards (that is, only a third of members of staggered boards are up for election each year); staggered boards are practically non-existent in Canada;
3. Curtailing the role and duration of poison pills as a defense mechanism against takeovers; these attempts have been largely unsuccessful in the U.S., particularly in States which grant very specific and extensive powers to the board of directors in situations of attempted takeover; none of these defenses are available to Canadian companies as a result of decrees by the securities commissions.
The result is that Canadian boards are less empowered than the board of any run-of-the mill American corporation. American activists would hail Canada as the Promised Land for shareholder rights.
 Who owns the publicly listed corporations?
Society at large may rightfully claim that it has a stake in companies operating in its midst, a stake just as important as that of shareholders (Brennan, 2005) . No doubt that a fickle, volatile, ever-changing shareholding base provides arguments for a different concept of "who owns the company".
The basic assumption underlying "corporate democracy", the one-share-one vote mantra, has become questionable. In a world of "empty voting", total return
Introduction
The theme of this conference could well have been "Good Capitalism versus Bad
Capitalism" because short-termism and unchecked activities of speculative funds are emblematic of "bad capitalism", of the kind we must get rid. What sort of capitalistic system produces 25 hedge (read "speculative") fund managers who earn five times the total pay of all the CEOs of the 500 largest American companies, themselves often upbraided for their excessive compensation?
John Gray writes in
What sort of capitalism would reward a fund manager with an $8 billion pay check for a single year's speculations and gambles with other people's money? A middle class citizen earning an honest $50,000 a year would have been working since the Middle Palaeolithic period some 160,000 years to get to that figure.
No doubt, forceful actions could, and should, be taken to counteract the pernicious nature of "financial capitalism", but we must first answer convincingly three related questions:
 Are activist investors and hedge funds really short-term players whose actions have a negative impact on corporations in the longer term?
 Do boards really need to be better insulated from the actions of "activist" investors as well as from unwanted takeovers?
My answer to these three questions is a resounding "YES"; but that will not suffice.
Let's examine each one of these questions in turn.
Is short-termism in corporate management a truly serious problem? If so, why has it come about?
There is ample evidence of these forces at play.
 Anyone who has participated in, or listened to, the quarterly conference calls with analysts has to be struck by the unreal focus of these people on the short-term, on the earnings per share of the next quarter and the current year. We should not underestimate the impact on the psyche of executives from the quarterly prodding and second-guessing going on in these sessions. If or when executives have to come to them with a less than stellar performance, all hell breaks loose. This charade is truly intimidating, particularly in companies with no controlling shareholder.
 All senior managers know the cost and pain of coming up short on expected quarterly earnings-per-share. (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005) .
 Ponder what sorts of incentives are really built in executive compensation packages. Examine what metrics are proposed by proxy advisors and others to
give a "good-governance" seal of approval to executive compensation. Subtly or not so subtly, and despite claims to the contrary, they all drive management to a short-term focus (Unless you happen to define three years as long term). Claims to have linked compensation to long-term performance are largely spurious. Giving executives a yearly dose of stock options and restricted shares, no matter that they vest only sometime in the future or on the basis of some sort of future performance, means that, this year and next year, some past grants are coming to maturity; therefore, whatever the performance hurdle or the stock price set some years ago, the results this year and next year will determine how much an executive will reap from these prior incentives.
Are activist investors and hedge funds really short-term players whose actions may well have a negative impact on corporations in the longer term?
The fact that some corporate management may succumb to short-termism does not necessarily imply that institutional investors, activists or otherwise, are also short-term in their actions and their strategies.
A few facts:
 Publicly traded companies are now "owned" by institutional investors, pension funds, mutual funds and others. In the U.S. over 70% of the shares of the 1000 largest companies are in the hands of institutional investors; in Canada, the prevalence of controlling shareholders and dual class of shares create a different profile of company ownership.
 All institutional investors have become "activist shareholders"; their public accountability for yearly (and, in some cases, quarterly) results has raised their sensitivity to the short-term performance of the stocks in their portfolio.
Theirs is a "soft" activism, however, made up of insistence on various governance measures, on incentive systems that link pay to performance, and so forth. That approach is to be contrasted to the "hard" activism of 
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By 1985, the average holding period had already dropped to some 1.5 years; the further drop (to under one year) may be the product of speed traders and others;
but there is no doubt that shares were held for a much longer period of time before the first wave (since the 1920s) of short-term "investors" appeared in the 1980s.
The phenomenon is a worldwide one as shown by Figure 3 charting the average holding period of several stock exchanges.
Figure 3
But what about hedge funds: are their investment strategies short-term and do they foster a short-term orientation in corporate management?
One would think that the nature and size of their compensation (annual cash compensation based on a percentage (usually 20% or more) of the return of the fund) would tend to induce a short-term view of performance. Bratton, 2006 / Brav et al., 2007 All these moves, if implemented, will likely boost stock price in the short-term. One could also argue that, for example, selling "under-performing" divisions or "changing strategy and leadership" could bring lasting benefits to the company but only if the hedge funds made the right call; given their lack of management and operational expertise, one may be skeptical about their long-term wisdom.
Does the price increase from the actions of hedge funds represent true economic value creation?
The debate is raging within academia on that topic. Some studies purport to demonstrate a lasting positive effect on the productivity of the firms targeted (Brav, Jiang, and Kim, April 2013) . However, the increase in stock price may be largely accounted for, not by true wealth creation, but by transfer of wealth to shareholders from bondholders and from employees. (Klein and Zur, 2010; Hu and Li, 2010, Brav et al., 2010 By the way, some of these researchers also claim that activist hedge funds are not short-term investors because they hold their positions for more than a year on average and sometimes for almost two years! Again, holding periods of one or two years qualify an investor as long-term! Are financial markets so myopic that they do not factor in the current price the long-term negative impact, if any, of hedge funds' short-term actions?
Finally, a last argument is put forward to sustain the argument that hedge funds cannot benefit from short-term action which might have a deleterious impact on stock price in the longer term: "efficient" financial markets would see through such moves and would factor longer term effects into short-term prices, therefore depriving hedge funds of their short-term gains. Warren Buffett has stated: "if markets were efficient, I would be a beggar in the street with a tin cup".
Bebchuk ( The most generous conclusion one may reach from these empirical studies has to be that "activist" hedge funds create some short-term wealth for shareholders (and immense riches for themselves), in a minority of cases bring some lasting benefits to companies, but largely they succeed through wealth transfer (from debt holders and employees) rather than wealth creation.
A governance revolution?
Perhaps the real lesson to be drawn from the actions of activist speculative (or so called hedge) funds may be that corporate governance needs to undergo some fundamental questioning, a revolution perhaps. The last time this has occurred was in the 1980s with a wave of leveraged buy-outs (LBO). The LBO funds claimed that the governance of publicly listed companies was weak, complacent and incompetent at setting the kind of incentive system that would drive high performance. Only by privatizing the companies could the right kind of valuecreating governance be put in place. We proposed a different kind of governance: value-creating governance. We made the point that there might be lessons to be learned from the kind of governance put in place by LBO/ private equity funds in the companies they privatized.
Yet, we concluded our piece for the C.D. Howe Institute on a somewhat pessimistic note. There are four critical differences between private equity funds driving the management of a privatized company and the board of directors of a stockexchange listed corporation:
1. The board members of the privatized company, often made up of general partners of the fund, are compensated at a level and in a manner hardly conceivable for board members of a publicly listed company.
2.
Board members of the newly privatized company must not be "independent"
and rarely are; a majority of board members of publicly listed companies must be "independent".
3.
The boards of listed corporations must discharge fully all their fiduciary and legal responsibilities; that component of governance grabs a good portion of the time available to board members; privatized companies have none of these hassles and can concentrate on strategy, cash flow management, etc.
4.
The board of a privatized company will call directly on outside consulting firms to assess the company, its competitors and so forth, and the external consultants will report directly to the board. Now imagine that the board of a publicly listed company were to inform management that it intends to hire some firm to audit the company's strategy and benchmark its performance.
That would not fly well and would certainly create severe tensions between the board and management. Management would claim that the board is straying away from its governance role; it would contend that the company regularly gets this sort of studies and reports regularly to the board on their results, etc.
Eventually, popular outcry led to political actions to clip the wings of the LBO revolution. But their actions have had a lasting influence on corporate governance, most spectacularly in the form and level of executive compensation. We owe to this period the emergence of large chunks of stock options as a means of motivating executives to work exclusively for shareholders.
Once again, it may be that "activist" hedge funds are enriching themselves on the back of a governance failure; we have tightened, refined and expanded the fiduciary aspects of corporate governance over the last 10 years. Most observers would agree that the continued fine tuning of fiduciary governance will result in sharply diminishing returns.
But we have not solved the basic quandary of governance: the asymmetry of information, knowledge and time invested between the governors and the governed, between the board of directors and management. What has happened recently at Canadian Pacific and SNC Lavallin, both companies with stellar governance scores, underlines the fact that fiduciary governance, no matter how well executed, will too often fall short.
Until forms of governance are designed to cope with this fundamental issue, boards will be prone to surprises, kept in the dark about various goings-on in the company, insufficiently informed to push hard on management for lasting high performance. In the current form of governance, corporate directors are somewhat akin to skaters making intricate arabesques on a frozen lake but unaware of the teeming life going on underneath.
Do boards really need to be better insulated from the actions of "activist" investors as well as from unwanted takeovers?
This question brings a different response in the Canadian context than it does in the U.S. context of corporate ownership and board empowerment. First, as shown in Table 1 , the largest 100 Canadian companies (on the basis of revenues) exhibit a diverse ownership structure: In making his case against board "insulation", Bebchuk (2013) writes:
"I should stress that my focus in this paper is on board insulation as an instrument for
serving the interests of long-term shareholders.
Board insulation has also been supported as an instrument of protecting the interests of stakeholders such as employees. Such claims are beyond the scope of this paper".
The legal responsibility of Canadian boards to evaluate the impact of a takeover on several constituencies should be protected by appropriately empowering boards of directors to discharge their responsibility.
Not only are there several stakeholders with large interest at stakes whenever a company is threatened by a takeover but there are also divergent groups of shareholders with potentially divergent interests. Within days of a takeover offer becoming public, the abnormal trading volume indicates that 30% to 40% of the shares have now moved into the hands of new types of shareholders.
Of course, as a result of this market demand, the stock price rises to a level close to the offering price. Any fund which has moved into the stock at that time has to be betting that the transaction will close at the offering price or at a higher price. The worst outcome would be for the transaction to abort and the stock price to return to its former level, inflicting large losses on any fund that moved in during the days after the announcement of a takeover bid. Arbitrage funds and some hedge funds specialize in these betting games.
These new "shareholders" should not be granted the full rights of a long-term shareholder; they should not have the right to vote on whether the company should be sold or a poison pill should stay in place! The whole point of their existence is to get these companies sold out at the best price and as quickly as possible. That's how they make their money.
Changing the game of takeovers in Canada
In 2007  Securities commissions should cease to regulate conduct by boards in relation to shareholder rights plans ("poison pills").
 Substantive oversight of directors' duties in mergers and acquisitions matters should be provided by the courts.
 The Ontario Securities Commission should provide leadership to the Canadian Securities Administrators in making the above changes, and initiate action if collective action is not taken before the end of 2008.
Nothing happened until recently. The Canadian securities commissions have now undertaken a process to review and modify the rules they set some 20 years ago whereby boards of directors were basically stripped of all authority and turned into sales agents seeking the highest bidder for the company.
The Ontario Securities Commission seems prepared to take but a timid, ineffective, step. Allowing a poison pill (or shareholder rights measure) to be extended as long as shareholders vote for the proposal will not change anything. As explained above,
by the time such a vote would be held, a large proportion of the "shareholders"
would be new comers who are intent on selling the company. It is in the interest of Canada that the AMF proposal be adopted by all Canadian securities commissions.
The most fundamental issue for widely held corporations everywhere has become: "who owns the publicly listed corporations"?
The basic assumption underlying "corporate democracy", the one-share-one vote mantra, has become questionable. In a world of "empty voting", total return swaps, record date capture, speed-trading, transient share flippers, arbitrageurs, speculators and game players, the question arises: are any and all shareholders the legitimate owners of publicly traded corporations?
In all decent societies, "Tourists don't vote!" and "Gamblers don't own the casino!"
In the current stock market context, the practice of granting the full and immediate rights of corporate citizenship, including the right to vote, to shareholders immediately upon their appearance in the rostrum of shareholders, does not make sense anymore.
The democratic equivalent to this practice would consist of granting the right to vote to anyone who happens to be in the country on Election Day (recent immigrants, tourists, business travelers, etc.).
Every democracy imposes a minimum period of time before a newcomer acquires the full rights of citizenship, particularly the right to vote. Corporate democracy likewise should call for a modicum of commitment from a shareholder before he or she can influence the destiny of the corporation, for example a one-year holding period.
Conclusions and recommendations
Short-termism and activism on the part of institutional investors are here to stay. A cost/benefit analysis of this phenomenon would probably show benefits for investors and fund managers with the costs borne by workers, debt holders, longterm investors and the society at large.
But, short-termism by investors does not have to translate into short-termism in the management of corporations, which is destructive and should be fought vigorously. Several measures would likely moderate this overall trend:
1. The ownership make-up of the large business organizations in a society will determine the level of vulnerability of its economy to the actions of "activists" of all sorts. The Canadian make-up shows (See Table 1 6. The best, most exemplary corporate governance has fallen short in several recent instances. Fiduciary governance has reached its point of diminishing returns. We must move from a strictly fiduciary type of governance to a "value-creating" governance; this latter form of corporate governance will call for unusual arrangements, different selection criteria for board members, enhanced compensation of board members, and so on; we are in the process of working out the how's and what's of this revolution in governance;
we believe that it is essential for the welfare of capitalist societies that we cope with the challenge of establishing a "value-creating" governance in widely held corporations. Otherwise, this type of corporation may well become extinct.
Finally, I should stress the immense role that institutional investors, public pension funds in particular, may, must, play in several critical areas. These funds bear a singular responsibility:
 They are the largest providers of money to hedge funds and private equity funds; whatever costs to society at large come about as a result of the actions of these financial players, institutional investors are partly responsible. Without the large sums of money coming from pension funds and endowments, these activist funds would be small, negligible entities. Pension funds cannot hide, and tacitly support, activist hedge funds without getting some of the mud on them;
 These institutional investors are fairly determined to tame and discipline management compensation programs, to tie compensation to performance, presumably, of the long-term sort; yet, the compensation of their own senior management often comes short of the high standard they want to impose on corporations; the link between their compensation scheme and the longterm performance of the fund is as tenuous and opaque as it is in publicly listed corporations.
 Institutional investors will be very influential in the debate going on about the proper regime for takeovers in Canada. These funds, the public pension funds in particular, should put the overall interest of the Canadian economy and society ahead of their short-term interest; the open season on Canadian companies that is abetted by the current regime will prove, sooner or later, untenable; those responsible for maintaining any longer this unhealthy regime will be held accountable.
 These funds are major clients of proxy advisors; they should use this leverage to discipline these influential and troubling new comers to corporate governance; IGOPP has published a policy paper urging institutional investors to take action: 
